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MANAGING RISK AND VULNERABILITY IN ASIA: A 25-YEAR VILLAGE STUDY 
FROM THAILAND 
 
Jonathan Rigg (Durham University) and Albert Salamanca 
(Asian Institute of Technology) 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
In the 1980s, rural settlements in the Northeast of Thailand were farming-focused and 
strategies of living were structured around the need to secure subsistence in the face of a 
capricious environment and a weak developmental state. More than half of households in 
the region lived below the poverty line and the immediate prospects for „development‟ 
were not bright. Drawing on a 25-year longitudinal study of two villages in 
Mahasarakham, the paper describes and reflects on how risk and vulnerability have been 
re-shaped during a quarter of a century of profound economic and social change. From 
largely environmental and local, the pattern of risk and opportunity have become 
increasingly economic and non-local as external events wash across the shores of rural 
settlements like Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn.  
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MANAGING RISK AND VULNERABILITY IN ASIA: A 25-YEAR VILLAGE STUDY 
FROM THAILAND 
 
Introduction: risk, crisis and living 
 
In the early 1980s, the development prospects of the villages of Ban Non Tae and Ban 
Tha Song Korn in the marginal Northeastern region of Thailand were not bright (Figure 1 
[Map of Thailand and study settlements]. Not only did these villages have to contend with 
a capricious climate that made wet rice cultivation a challenge and a struggle, but wider 
events seemed to be intent on disrupting the Thai government‟s attempts to foster 
„development‟. Successive oil price rises, a faltering economy, stubbornly high levels of 
poverty, the continuing role of the Communist Party of Thailand, and fears that Vietnam 
might be expansionist given that country‟s foray into Cambodia all contributed to the 
sense that rural Northeast Thailand was going nowhere fast. This is not to say that 
villagers in the region were destitute; they may have lead meagre lives, they may even 
have been poor in the way in which the development industry has been intent on 
counting, describing and categorising the poor; but the inhabitants of Ban Non Tae and 
Ban Tha Song Korn were not destitute in the sense of being without food, shelter and 
clothing. Households generally met their subsistence needs and owned the principal 
resource to achieve this – their land. In many respects, the individuals and families the 
first author worked with in the early 1980s were rich, if wealth is considered in cultural, 
social and psychological rather than purely economic terms. 
 
Since then, Thailand has made the transition – on the back of a so-called economic 
„miracle‟ – from a low income and developing, agricultural economy, to a middle income, 
mixed economy. The country has also become thoroughly integrated and mobile, with 
families juggling mixed livelihoods in different places. This process of rapid social and 
economic transformation has not, however, been smooth (Figure 2 [Graph of GDP 
growth, poverty and development events]). The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 led to a 
sharp contraction in the economy and the current global economic malaise may also, in 
time, be regarded as an equally important historical „moment‟.  
 
In this paper we are intent on exploring the way in which risk and vulnerability are 
produced and reproduced over time. More particularly, we are interested in considering 
how risk and vulnerability are re-shaped in the context of a rapidly integrating, expanding 
and „modernising‟ economy and society. Have, in short, the changes that have 
reverberated through Thailand also altered the way in which risk and vulnerability are 
produced, transmitted, experienced and managed at the levels of the village, the 
household and the individual? We will address these issues by drawing on a longitudinal 
study of two villages in Northeast Thailand that began in 1982: Ban Non Tae and Ban 
Tha Song Korn. To provide some ethnographic substance we will also focus on the 
experience of one woman, Mrs Achara Wattana, who while not a „case study‟ or an 
„exemplar‟ does, in the specificity of her life experiences, illuminate the issues which we 
also raise in more general terms.  
 
UNPICKING RISK AND VULNERABILITY THROUGH A QUARTER OF A CENTURY 
OF CHANGE 
 
In 1982 when the first author visited Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn in the 
Northeastern Thai province of Mahasarakham, it was easy to assume and imagine that 
villages such as these were, to a significant extent, „worlds unto themselves‟. We are not 
suggesting that there was no mobility or interaction with the world beyond the village, but 
this was limited, certainly when compared with today. Two of the earliest detailed village 
surveys carried out in Northeast Thailand are those of Mizuno in 1964 (Fukui 1993) and 
the CUSRI Village Study of 1969-70 (Amara Pongsapich et al. 1976), both conducted in 
the province of Khon Kaen which neighbours Mahasarakham. In Mizuno‟s survey, 126 
out of 132 households were agricultural and not one household engaged in extra-village 
work as a matter of course, although there was some dry-season labour migration to the 
local town of Tha Phra to work in a kenaf processing factory. Rice, fruit and vegetables 
were cultivated for home consumption, livestock were raised, fish and crabs trapped in 
local watercourses, most clothes were made at home by the women of the household, 
and many farm implements and household goods were home made as well. This is not to 
say such economies were un-monetised – Mizuno writes of villagers having to buy metal 
plough shares, twine to make fishing nets, oil lamps, rubber sandals and, occasionally, a 
bicycle or radio (Fukui 1993: 274). A similar picture of a largely subsistence village 
existence (rather than „economy‟) where the spatial bubble of the settlement remained 
largely unpunctured is also evident in Amara Pongsapich et al.‟s study of the late 1960s.  
 
Today in Thailand, across the country every settlement is thoroughly economically and 
spatially integrated, dependent on resources and opportunities situated beyond the 
boundaries of the village, indeed beyond the sub-district, district and province. While 
Amara and Mizuno describe households that met most of their immediate needs, and 
villages which were collectively almost self-sufficient in the basics of life, villages are now 
far from being places where space (settlement), economy (livelihoods) and community 
(society), intersect. The village has „dissociated‟ in multiple ways:1 families are stretched 
across space and newly mobile populations have led to the emergence of „shadow‟ 
households where members may not be co-resident; livelihoods are increasingly 
delocalised and differentiated; subsistence crops have been partially replaced by cash 
crops; and community practices such as reciprocal labour exchange (long khaek) have 
largely disappeared. This should come as of no great surprise. But in commenting on the 
ubiquity of such patterns and processes there is a risk that something quite profound may 
be missed: the dissolution of one of the key building blocks of rural scholarship in the 
Global South – „the village‟. 
 
In the context of this paper, we are specifically interested in exploring how these 
processes of dissociation have re-shaped the way in which risk is transmitted, 
experienced, managed and ameliorated. To explore this question, we will characterise 
the nature of risk in two periods separated by a quarter of a century of profound social, 
economic and environmental change: 1982-83 and 2008-9.  
 
Risk and vulnerability in 1982-83 
 
In the early 1980s, the key risks facing rural households in the Northeast of Thailand 
related to the possibility that their subsistence wet rice crop might fail. Fields were rain-
fed and, with a seasonal and highly variable pattern of rainfall, the chances of individual 
crop failure were high. Indeed, the core of the subsistence strategy of villagers revolved 
around how to maintain output in such a context and this involved planting a range of rice 
varieties across different agro-ecological niches, all with a view to maintaining a certain 
minimum level of output, and thus ensuring subsistence (see Grandstaff 1981, 1988, 
1992 and 2009, Rigg 1985, 1986, 1991 and 1993). A „safety first‟ principle prevailed. As 
the classic Thai novel of rural life in Northeast Thailand in the 1930s, Luuk Isaan, 
recounts: “When Koon and Jundi and their fathers arrived at the phuyaiban’s [headman‟s] 
house, the men talked about what they always talked about – the lack of rain and the lack 
of food in the village” (Kampoon Boontawee 1988: 202). This picture of the risks and 
vulnerabilities facing rural people in a subsistence world resonates with much of the 
classic literature, exemplified by R.H. Tawney‟s well known reflections on China in the 
early 1930s: 
 
                                                 
1
 For papers that explore such issues see, for example, Rigg et al 2008 (Thailand), Caces et 
al 1985 (Philippines) and Thompson, 2004 and 2007 (Malaysia). 
 
“There are districts [in China] in which the position of the rural population is that of a 
man standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient 
to drown him” (Tawney 1932: 77, see also Scott 1976) 
 
In addition to household „strategies‟ being finely tuned to juggle environmental risk 
against subsistence necessity, the villages of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn also 
supported a set of social practices and community arrangements – a „moral‟ economy – 
that served to provide additional support when household and family subsistence 
strategies came under pressure. Friends, neighbours and relatives would share work and 
reward, assist during times of crisis, and provide a community safety net which further 
underpinned individual household strategies (Table 1). The historical literature on Thai 
rural settlements notes that occasionally even these layers of practice, action and 
response were inadequate and, then, villagers would stop „managing‟ and start 
responding in emergency mode. This might mean selling a daughter into prostitution, 
disposing of core assets (in particular, land), banditry – or simply abandoning the village 
(Table 1).  
 
Risk and vulnerability in 2008-09 
 
In the villages of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn today, many of these approaches 
to managing livelihood risks are either no longer possible, and/or no longer desirable. 
Households generally do not own land ranged across different agroecosystems; the 
carefully selected rice varieties attuned to the specific environmental conditions of 
different ricelands are largely forgotten; the wildlands of the 1980s have been decimated 
and denuded; the extension of childhood into the late teens means that children are not 
available as an economic resource; and community practices of self-help and community 
support have largely dissolved and disappeared.  
  
This does not mean, however, that life has become riskier; indeed, far from it. While the 
villages are just as unequal places as they were, they are also materially richer – and 
richer across the spectrum (Figure 3 [graph of incomes by quintile]). At its simplest level, 
the spectre of hunger has been banished. Today, no one goes hungry in Ban Non Tae 
and Ban Tha Song Korn. More obviously, but less significantly, it can also be seen 
reflected in consumerist markers of status: in the ownership of televisions, mobile 
phones, motorbikes, pick-up trucks, microwave ovens, refrigerators and electric rice 
cookers.
2
 Moreover, in the place of traditional practices of dealing with livelihood risks are 
new schemes and practices (Table 2). The key changes here are concurrent shifts from 
farm to non-farm, from local to extra-local, from social to economic, and from community 
to state. These transformations, we suggest, are profound in the way in which they have 
restructured how rural people experience, think about and respond to livelihood risks. 
 
In the 1980s, the field notes of the first author record parents saying they could not see 
the utility of going to school beyond learning to read the back of a pesticide packet and 
calculating the interest on a loan or the return from selling 500 kg of rice. Why, they 
would rhetorically ask, does a child need to learn history or English? By the 1990s, the 
value of education was unquestioned – and the more, the better. During the Thai 
financial crisis of 1997-98 – which led to a contraction of more than 10% in the Thai 
economy (four times greater than that expected from the current crisis) – the World Bank 
and many analysts predicted that poorer households would have to take their children out 
of school, and that this would have long-term effects on their livelihoods and on 
Thailand‟s wider development prospects (World Bank 1998, but also see World Bank 
1999).
 3
 But in a separate study conducted in the district of Sanpathong in Chiang Mai 
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 A point that Grandstaff et al also make for the region as a while (2009: 290-291). 
 
3
 The Thai economy expanded by 2.6% in 2008 and is projected to contract by -2.7% in 2009 
(World Bank 2009: 4). In 1998 the Thai economy contracted by over 10%. 
province in 1999-2000, not a single child was removed from the local school during the 
months of the crisis (Rigg and Sakunee Nattapoolwat 2001). Households took many 
other actions to adapt and adjust to tide themselves over the crisis: they sold assets, 
borrowed money, cut back on certain foods, and sent returning laid-off sons and 
daughters back to the city to find work as soon as possible. But they did not take their 
children out of school. 
 
In 1980 it was hard for teachers to convince parents to send their sons and daughters to 
school beyond the four years of compulsory basic primary education; by the turn of the 
Millennium parents would do all they could to keep their children in school. Children have 
become an economic resource not through their immediate labour value but through their 
future value secured by their engagement in new arenas of skill- and education-intensive 
work which might then provide a stream of remittances to sustain parents in later life. As 
indicative of this shift in the relative values ascribed to different assets, there have been 
reports of farmers selling their land to finance their children‟s education (Phusadee 
Arunmas 2009: B14) – although it should be added that there was no evidence of this 
from Ban No Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn, possibly because other routes to financing 
education were available to families. 
 
The „state‟, while not quite the developmental state of East Asian persuasion (but see 
Dixon 2001, Booth 1999), is hard to escape in rural areas of Thailand. Powerfully, though 
indirectly, the inhabitants of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn are connected to the 
world beyond the village by roads, bridges and electrification, and well as by education 
and diversifying social networks. These, in turn, bring television and newspapers and 
mental connections which are at least as important as the heightened levels of mobility 
that improving transport has allowed. Successive Thai governments have also invested 
in a plethora of other areas; in education and health care, in family planning and 
agricultural extension, in subsidised loans to farmers and clean water, in support for farm 
inputs and the subsidisation of outputs, and in training and irrigation projects. This is not, 
of course, all „free‟: villagers are indebted to a degree that was not the case in the 1980s, 
and this debt is guaranteed using farmers traditionally most precious asset – their land. 
Ironically, many of the investments that the state has made in rural areas of Thailand 
have done more to extract people from the countryside and from farming, than they have 
to support rural living and farm-based livelihoods.  
 
From local environmental to extra-local economic risk 
 
The approaches to making a living outlined above also reflect a change in the location 
and nature of risk. In the 1980s, risks largely revolved around locally experienced 
environmental perturbations. Some of these may have arisen from regional-level events 
– flood and drought, for instance – but the impacts and responses were local. There were 
other crises to be sure. Historical accounts recount disease and conflict sweeping across 
the region from time to time. But there was little that villagers could do about these in 
terms of strategising. With the integration of villagers into broader national and 
international circuits of production, consumption and exchange, so the threats – and the 
solutions – to livelihood crises have similarly been „scaled up‟.  
 
The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis led to millions of Thai migrant workers being laid off, 
often with little or no severance pay. Housed in dormitories or rented rooms close to the 
factories and building sites where they worked, many returned to their villages in rural 
areas – villages like Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn. The 2008-9 crisis has 
produced a similar set of effects, albeit less pronounced. A global economic crisis has led 
to loss of employment (or a reduction in hours worked) in the industrial and service 
sectors in Thailand, which is particularly pronounced among younger workers; migrant 
workers have been laid off, many without compensation; remittances to rural areas have 
                                                                                                                                            
 
fallen; some of the unemployed have taken refuge in their villages of origin; and 
agriculture has struggled to absorb these laid-off workers, putting rural economies under 
additional strain (World Bank 2009, NSO 2009).
4
 In consequence, poverty is projected to 
rise in 2009. 
 
There has been a quite vigorous debate about what these economic crises mean for rural 
peoples – and for strategies of development. A populist response that has considerable 
traction in Thailand is that they amply show the dangers of engaging with the world 
economy and emphasise that stable and sustainable livelihoods need to be built on a re-
invigoration of the farm and village economy. Indeed the Thai government, with the 
urging of the King of Thailand, made just such a view the centrepiece and the guiding 
philosophy of the 9
th
 Five-year Social and Economic Development Plan (2002-2006).
5
 
 
Unfortunately for these romantanistas, the 1997-98 crisis did not lead to a long-term re-
orientation of rural livelihoods. The trends which can be dated from the mid-1980s have 
continued. Even a contraction in the economy of -10.5% in 1998 and a rise in the number 
of rural poor from 14.9% (1996) to 21.5% (2000) of the population (see Figure 2) failed 
significantly to do more than retard temporarily earlier trends. Just as the farmers of the 
early 1980s were held hostage by the vagaries of climate and the marginality of their 
environment, so the farmers-cum-workers of the 2000s are held hostage by the 
dependencies linked to Thailand‟s thorough-going and enthusiastic engagement with the 
world economy. Even the King of Thailand, it seems, is unable to wean the rural 
population off their consumerist, non-farm desires. In 1986, 71% of households in the 
Northeast reported that agriculture provided their main source of income; by 1994, shortly 
before the crisis, this figure had declined to 45%; in 2004, it stood at 37%. Income from 
remittances and non-farm activities, meanwhile, contributed the main source of income of 
63% of households in 2004, up from 29% in 1986 (Figure 4 [main source of income in 
Northeast, 1986-2004]).  
 
Dealing with crisis: social capital and the dissociation of the village community 
 
One outcome of the processes described above, as noted, is the „dissociation‟ of the 
village economy. This is mainly described in economic terms: the village as a container of 
economic and livelihoods practices has partially dissolved. There have, though, also 
been social implications. In particular, the „social capital‟ which went some way to 
regulating and patterning inter-household and intra-village relations has been devalued. 
Villagers are less likely to resort to community support mechanism to tide them over 
periods of crisis and shortage; they are also, for that matter, less likely to be offered such 
support. As Thompson says of the village in Malaysia, while gotong royong (mutual aid, 
reciprocity) may remain a trope to encompass kampung (village) life, gotong royong spirit 
is largely absent. For Thompson, the village in Malaysia has become „socially urban‟ in 
the manner of its functioning and there is as much gotong royong in the apartments of 
Kuala Lumpur as there is in the countryside; in Thailand, something similar is in the 
process of emerging (see Thompson 2002, 2004 and 2007).  
 
In a separate study in central Thailand (see Rigg et al 2008), the settlements in question 
were becoming more integrated and, in that sense, more „open‟ villages. At the same 
time however, they were becoming more „closed‟ communities. Traditionally, house 
compounds were not fenced, and owned space was not rigorously demarcated or 
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 The Oriental Hotel, for example, has not offered new contracts to temporary staff. The 
service charge that staff receive in addition to their salaries has also been cut, so much so 
that a number of staff have left this prestigious hotel.  
 
5
 “The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006) adopts the 
philosophy of sufficiency economy bestowed by His Majesty the King to his subjects as the 
guiding principle of development and management” (NESDB 2002: i). 
 
patrolled. Villagers would drop by each other‟s houses for a chat, to share their food and 
to engage in the collective experience of what it was to be a chao ban or villager. It was 
normal to walk across another villager‟s house compound without asking permission. 
The village was a quasi-collective space where people interacted with comparative 
freedom and openness. Now most houses compounds are fenced and most houses are 
gated and grilled. Village ceremonies and festivities, the very performed essence of 
social capital, have undergone a similar process of change. From being collective and 
inclusive affairs for which food was cooked and shared by the community and in which 
everyone was a participant, weddings and other celebrations today require outside 
commercial caterers to be brought in and participation is by invitation rather than by 
custom based on membership of the village community.  
 
The same debates characterise Ban Non Tae and Tha Song Korn. The 47 year-old 
agrarian entrepreneur, Mr Suchart, laments the increasing individualisation of the village 
which he describes as becoming “like a city” where “we live on our own; we‟re not 
supporting each other anymore”. With regard to reciprocal labour exchange, the practise 
has become a victim of heightened expectations such as better food served during the 
activity, raising the real cost to farmers. Furthermore, because there is no longer a 
shared experience of what it means to be a villager as livelihoods have increasingly 
diversified into non-farm and non-local activities, so practices based on such assumed 
shared experiences have become harder to sustain. This is not to say that „the village‟ is 
disappearing. Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn are physically and administratively 
still „there‟, to be found, visited and researched. There are village monasteries, schools 
and headmen; there is a sub-district village administration and statistics are collected at 
the village level. The village has „traction‟ in these senses. But the village covenant has 
been fractured. We certainly do not wish to romanticise the past and see this fracturing 
as a necessarily negative and destructive process; but it has occurred, a point that is 
locally accepted.
6
 
 
Vulnerability and resilience in a post-community rural world 
 
The spectre of climate change has led to a proliferation of studies on vulnerability and 
resilience. Our longitudinal study of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn, although it is 
not explicitly focused on issues of climate change, is concerned with understanding 
transformations under conditions of social, economic and environmental stress and 
turbulence. It thus, we suggest, provides some insights into these wider debates. One 
particular theme in the climate change literature is an interest in understanding „resilient 
communities‟.   
 
„Communities‟ are usually seen in this literature as spatially situated: “We view 
communities as the totality of social system interactions within a defined geographic 
space…” (Cutter et al. 2008: 599 [emphasis added]). In turn, resilient communities are 
“inextricably linked to the condition of the environment and the treatment of its resources” 
(Cutter et al 2008: 601). When this community of intersecting social and environmental 
capitals is unpicked – as they certainly are in Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn – 
then vulnerability is seen to ensue. Thus, in their work on vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate variability in Uttarakhand, India, Kelkar et al. (2008: 571) reflect that “as they 
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 We are mindful of Samuel Popkin‟s rejoinder to James Scott‟s (1976) moral economy thesis: 
“A way of life that may have existed only for lack of alternatives is extolled as a virtue. 
Peasants who had little or nothing to eat are assumed to have had a rich spiritual life.  Sons 
who may have stayed with their fathers only in order to survive are credited with filial piety. 
What may have been the absence of incentives to change becomes a resistance to 
innovation and a defense of traditional ways. The rich who hid their wealth are perceived as 
having shown great modesty, and hostility among villages is converted to village solidarity. 
Somehow, what might only have been the necessities or oppressions of one era come to be 
interpreted as traditional values during the next” (Popkin 1979: 3). 
 
move towards non-agricultural jobs in the city…many [villagers] are becoming more 
vulnerable due to dislocation and disruption of their familiar way of life” (see also Acosta-
Michlik et al. 2008: 541) 
 
The experience of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn over a quarter of a century of 
perturbation offers a rather different view of vulnerability, resilience and adaptation, at 
least in this small corner of Northeast Thailand.
7
 To begin with, the idea of a spatially 
situated community is problematic when mobility, migration, shadow households, 
remittance landscapes and dispersed livelihood footprints are defining features of life and 
living across much of rural Asia.
8
 Resilience, it seems, is not to be uncovered in 
communities but in the spatially distributed networked lives that increasingly rural Thais – 
and many others – live, not because they are forced to as a result of livelihood failures „at 
home‟, but because it is in the combination of local and extra-local, farm and non-farm 
that resilience is to be found.
9
 Certainly, there are instances of distress migration of the 
type that Acosta-Michlik et al. allude to when they propose that “when all available and 
accessible adaptation measures fail, migration tends to be the ultimate solution” (2008: 
541); but migration in the two study sites, more often than not, is far from being a strategy 
of escape induced by a livelihood crisis. These adaptations are, moreover, not neat 
transformative shifts of one type of living to another, but multiple, over-lapping, nuanced 
and contingent changes where spatial and temporal mosaics emerge.  
 
There is no doubt that the inhabitants of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn, like 
those of most of Thailand‟s rural settlements, have become dramatically more mobile. 
Grandstaff et al. (2009: 299-301) using census and household registration data show that 
the majority of Northeastern rural households are likely to have a household member 
living outside the region – some 2.5 million. These are family members who have 
„absented‟ themselves from the household long-term. In addition to these missing 
villagers there are the seasonal migrants, who are also highly numerous. There are two 
points of note here which resonate with the experiences of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha 
Song Korn. First, migration and mobility have come to be defining features of life and 
living in Northeast Thailand. Migration is not an aberration – as it is so often presented in 
policy documents and by officials – but part of the essence of the Northeast in social and 
economic terms. Second, migration sustains a reformulated household which transcends 
space. No longer a „co-residential dwelling unit‟, the household is increasingly defined by 
its spatial disaggregation. In Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn one surprising 
outcome of this is that households are becoming both smaller and more complex. The 
average size of the household between the two survey dates declined from 6.3 (1982/83) 
to 4.7 (2008), but at the same time the proportion of nuclear family members (parents 
and children) also declined from 83.5% to 57.0% (Table 3). While the normal expectation 
is that social changes leading to smaller families also results in a reduction in household 
complexity as nuclear families become more common, the data from these two villages 
indicate that the reverse is happening. The most dramatic change is the increase in the 
number of grandchildren in the total household count, rising from 9.2% to 21.3%. These 
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 Although the story here also resonates with work in the Central Plains (Rigg et al 2008) and 
Northern region (Rigg and Sakunee Nattapoolwat 2001) of Thailand. 
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 See, for example, Thompson‟s work on Malaysia (2004, 2007), and McKay‟s work on the 
Philippines (2003, 2005). 
  
9
 This is not quite the whole picture. It is also very clear that there is a trend to work outside 
farming not just because it may deliver a higher income, but also because it is more desirable. 
Mr Palong Piroomyu, a farmer in Nakhon Pathom, has been quoted saying: “Most Thai 
farmers who send their kids to get higher education generally tell them to stay away from rice 
farming because it‟s back-breaking work with a high exposure to price fluctuations” 
(Phusadee Arunmas 2009: B14). 
  
are largely the „left-behind‟ children of absent migrant household members, a practice 
known as liang laan (taking care of grandchildren) (see Funahashi 1996). 
  
The erosion of social norms and the moral economy, on the one hand, and a disrupted 
and degraded environment on the other does not mean that villagers have less recourse 
to support structures during times of trouble, and are therefore more vulnerable; rather, 
those support structures have changed. They are more likely to be formal and 
institutional than informal and community; and they are increasingly centred on the 
immediate family, rather than an extended array of neighbours and friends – fellow 
villagers. While the village may have become increasingly dissociated, and households 
increasingly spatially separated, this has become intrinsic to building resilience and 
minimising risk in the context of Thailand‟s evolving economy. In addition the state, in 
various guises, has offered alternative social safety nets. All of this needs to be set 
against a broadly improving economic context where incomes have been rising, 
employment opportunities multiplying, the capacity of the state increasing, and the 
economy diversifying. 
 
State policies aimed at redistributing at least some of Thailand‟s wealth to rural areas 
came to a zenith under the populist administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 
and have remained in place since. The villagers of the study settlements welcomed 
Thaksin‟s 30 baht health care policy and the one million baht per village fund that he 
distributed to kick-start village development initiatives. They were also delighted when the 
short-lived administration of Thaksin‟s successor, Samak Sundaravej, in 2008 introduced 
free electricity (if usage was less than 50% of the allotted 10kwh per household per 
month), flooding assistance of 606 baht/rai, and financial support of 500 baht per month 
for the elderly (see Table 4).  
 
Liu et al. (2008) in their study of farmers‟ coping responses in China‟s Lower Yellow River 
note that vulnerability needs to be seen not as a snapshot, but as a historical process 
(pages 546 and 551). Our timelines from Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn 
emphasise this point where idiosyncratic household shocks are often the events 
propelling households into vulnerability. The death of key income earners is the obvious 
example. This shifts livelihood responsibilities to other household members, who often 
struggle to maintain the same level of productivity, profit and income. With lack of 
investment and the absence of key decision-makers, in time businesses may fail and 
assets such as land and livestock are sold to meet immediate exigencies. There is 
sometimes a cascade of cause and effect which can only be fully appreciated as a 
historical process.  
 
Mrs Achara Wattana: the dissociated management of risk  
 
The case of Mrs Achara Wattana provides a vignette into how rural families manage 
livelihood threats in Thailand in the 21
st
 century. 
 
Mrs Achara, is a 58 year-old widow and household head in Ban Non Tae. We interviewed 
her in May 2008, and for a second time in 2009. First impressions are of a vulnerable 
woman living at the margins – Tawney‟s woman „standing permanently up to the neck in 
water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown her‟. Achara is in poor health, suffering 
from heart problems and hypertension. Her husband was struck by lightning and killed in 
1975 when she was a young mother with three children of her own to support and one 
adopted son (her nephew). Her husband‟s livestock trading business consequently 
collapsed and, as a result, the household‟s main source of income dried up. Later, 
Achara was forced to sell a large part of her land to pay hospital bills. Of her three 
children, one son was killed in a road accident in 2006, a second son left the village to 
live in Phetchabun (another province in the Northeast), while Achara‟s only daughter lives 
with her husband in Bangkok.
10
 By 2008, a reasonably robust rural livelihood in the mid-
1970s, had become progressively a more marginal one. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that she has moved down the village wealth hierarchy. Our wealth ranking in 2008 placed 
Achara close to the category „poor‟, at least as defined by local villagers. Based on the 
quintile distribution of income, Achara‟s household in 1983 belonged to the 4th quintile 
(with the fifth being the richest); in 2008, her household had moved down to the 3
rd
 
quintile. 
 
A rural-focused view of Achara‟s existence generates a picture of vulnerability. For 
scholars such as Jim Glassman in his book Thailand at the margins (2004), the 
marginalisation of the Thai peasantry is part and parcel of the dependent industrialisation 
that has also made the country a deeply problematic „miracle‟ economy: 
 
“The growth [from the mid-1980s] was predicated heavily on marginalization of the 
peasantry, „feminization‟ of manufacturing labour, and fragmentation of labour and 
political opposition – thus ensuring that growth on the periphery of the periphery 
would be of the „sweatshop‟ variety…” (Glassman 2004: 205). 
 
An „everyday‟ view of Achara, however, provides an alternative insight to that afforded by 
a political economy of peripheral marginalisation perspective. Figure 5 [Mrs Achara‟s 
„extended‟ HH] shows that Achara is not alone in her rural redoubt: she looks after the 
children of her daughter – her two grandchildren. Achara‟s daughter and husband are 
caught up in the maelstrom of Thailand‟s miracle/crisis experience. Her son-in-law is a 
taxi driver; her daughter worked in a garment factory before she moved to Bangkok in 
2008 to join her husband. Between the two of them they remit around 3,000 to 4,000 baht 
(US$90-120) per month to support their children and their „carer‟ – Achara. A series of 
rural marginalisation processes shaped and driven by Thailand‟s industrialisation has 
also provided the support mechanisms which sustain families such as Achara‟s. This 
sustenance, however, is intimately associated with the very processes that some 
scholars highlight as emblematic of the vulnerabilities associated with Thailand‟s 
development model.
11
 Income data for the Northeast region resonate at a generalised 
level with Achara‟s experience. Table 5 shows that in 1981 farming and home-based 
activities generated 63% of rural household income; by 2004 this had more than halved 
to 27%. Over the same period, income from remittances quadrupled from 3.8% to 15.8%, 
while the share of non-farm income had doubled from 21.3% to 42.2%. At the same time, 
as noted above, spatially divided families had become the norm. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is striking how far scholars, development practitioners and government officials still 
rehearse the script of Northeast Thai villages being poor, farming dependent and 
isolated: 
 
“The popular view of Northeast Thailand (Isan) seems to have changed little over 
the years. As still portrayed in the media, impoverished farmers forever battle with 
poor soils, droughts and floods that devastate their subsistence rice crops upon 
which their livelihood depends. While the rest of Thailand develops, the Northeast 
lags behind, trapped in rural poverty and increasingly disadvantaged” (Grandstaff et 
al 2009: 289). 
 
                                                 
10
 The adopted son has also left the village and no longer keeps contact with his adoptive 
mother. 
 
11
 See for example Bello and Cunningham 1998. 
 
This, of course, then creates the context in which risk and vulnerability are framed in 
terms of a capricious environment, marginal lands and uncertain subsistence. We argue, 
however, that for the inhabitants of Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn – and for many 
others in fast-developing Asia – risk and vulnerability have been re-shaped in significant 
ways. This applies to where risks originate; how they are transmitted; how they are 
experienced; and how they are managed.   
 
The parameters of these changes are clear, as noted above: the shift from farm to non-
farm, from local to extra-local, from community to state, and from social to economic. 
These shifts are negotiated at the local level but they are very evidently responses to 
developments which have reverberated through Thai economic space linked to national 
policies and international perturbations. In sum, they raise questions about whether the 
„community‟ is any longer an appropriate unit through which we can reflect on either risk 
or resilience. As settlements no longer map neatly onto households; and as household 
livelihoods are no longer neatly captured through a village-focused perspective, where 
does that leave „community‟ studies? The idea of community has considerable popular 
appeal and, as outlined above, many studies of resilience highlight the necessity of re-
building or preserving community if resilience is to be maintained. But the emerging 
communities in this corner of Thailand are networked communities ranged across space 
where multi-situated households help to sustain rural settlements even as they erode 
rural communities.       
 
Research on rural development in Europe (see Marsden 2009) emphasises the necessity 
to address the „devaluing‟ of rural life if development which is socially, economically and 
environmentally sustainable is to be achieved, and points to the success of some locality-
based initiatives which stress multifunctional agriculture as a counter-movement to the 
usual agri-business tendencies. Marsden‟s paper ends by rhetorically asking whether 
“our conceptual lenses [are] sufficiently developed or refined to conceptualise [such 
alternatives] as more than archipelagoes in a sea of continued ecological resource abuse 
and constructed denial and peripherality?” (2009: 128). This study from rural Thailand 
certainly reinforces the view that our conceptual frameworks for thinking about the 
nature, location and management of risk are inadequate to the empirical realities of 
change. This applies to the units of analysis that are employed (the village, the 
household), the objects of concern (farming), our assumptions about the very nature of 
life in the rural South (immobile, farming-focused), and the ideals that inform our views 
(notions of community).  
 
 Table 1: ‘Scales’ of risk management in a ‘traditional’ Asian village (c.1980) 
 
Family and household scales of risk management 
Patterns of 
landownership and 
inheritance 
Managing land across a range of padi types from drought prone 
(and therefore flood protected) to flood prone (and drought 
protected). Planting across agroecosystems 
Rice variety 
selection strategy  
Selecting and planting rice varieties able to harness the particular 
qualities of different rice lands and be resistant to the environmental 
pressures that exist 
Upland cultivation Planting of „upland‟ (non-riceland) to crops such as kenaf (akin to 
jute) and cassava to earn a modest cash income  
Diversified family 
labour use 
strategies 
Division of labour across generations with pre-school and school 
age children regarded as a subsistence asset, and the elderly too  
Exploitation of 
„wild‟ resources 
Collection of non-timber forest products (frogs, fish, insects, honey, 
tubers, wild grasses, hunting…), usually divided by gender and 
generation 
Off-farm, dry 
season work 
Migration of men and women, sometimes whole families if 
conditions dictated, to areas where agricultural (large rice farms of 
the central plains, sugar fields of the western region) or non-
agricultural (on construction projects, in the urban informal sector) 
work is available 
On-farm dry 
season work 
Use of the dry season not only to mend farm implements and re-
roof houses, but to produce cloth and other handicrafts for sale and 
home use 
„Everyday peasant 
resistance‟ 
Peasant „sub-culture‟ including pilfering, gleaning, stealing (from the 
state, not from other villagers) and poaching 
Village and community scales of risk management 
Reciprocal labour 
exchange 
practices 
Sharing of tasks to meet the labour needs of peak periods in the 
farming cycle 
Gifts and loans Gifts and loans of money, time (labour) and food as a matter of 
course between relatives, friends and neighbours – given because 
the following year the positions might be reversed 
Practices of 
adoption 
Children that cannot be adequately cared for by the biological 
parents are adopted/fostered by (often quite distant) relatives 
Village rice banks The headman (phuu yai baan) on behalf of the village might assist 
those in particular difficulty 
Crisis responses 
Selling land As the core resource for survival, to sell land is a short term recipe 
for immediate survival, likely to lead to long term hardship     
Dissolving the 
family 
„Selling‟ daughters as indentured labour – with most entering the 
commercial sex industry. „Why do they [the villagers] let their girls, 
as young as 13, be sexually violated at the whim of strangers? … 
All such questions have to be swallowed when coming face-to-face 
with Pon Chaitep, a peasant who let his daughter go to work as a 
prostitute in Sungai Kolok, a town on the Malaysian border, in 
exchange for 15,000 baht [about US$600]. . . . “I didn‟t sell my 
daughter … She saw me suffer, she saw the family suffer. And she 
wanted to help”‟ (Sanitsuda Ekachai 1990: 169–70). 
Moving the family Abandoning the village and moving to a new location whether to 
carve out new lands or to areas where their might be work   
Banditry and crime Making the transition from low level crime (broadly accepted in 
village terms) to banditry  
 
Table 2: ‘Scales’ of risk management in a ‘modern’ Asian village (c.2009) 
 
Family and household scales of risk management 
Diversification 
beyond farming  
Rather than juggling different farm practices, households juggle farm 
and non-farm, working in factories, as traders, on construction sites, 
in supermarkets, and in government   
Delocalisation of 
work 
The subsistence „bubble‟ of the 1980s has been replaced by a 
household economy which straddles sectors and spaces, where the 
threads of livelihood reach across the Thailand economic space, 
and beyond  
Farming as a 
subsidiary buffer 
Households still farm but, for some, as a subsidiary and subservient 
activity. Upland and marginal riceland are planted to tree crops such 
as eucalyptus that require little care; rice is broadcast rather than 
transplanted; labour intensive vegetables are purchased from the 
market rather than cultivation in home gardens  
Security in  the 
education of 
children 
Children are educated as long and as far as possible even if that 
means borrowing money or leaving land unplanted. Education 
demands immediate outlay for future security  
„Everyday citizen 
resistance‟ 
The peasant „sub-culture‟ has been replaced by a citizen and voter 
sub-culture of popular resistance through the media, demonstration 
and the power of the ballot box 
State and national scales of risk management 
30 baht health 
scheme 
A „national health service‟ introduced by former PM Thaksin 
Shinawatra where poor Thais can access medical care through a 
one level fee of 30 baht (US$0.90, £0.50). 
State support Emergency support at times of crisis – during flood or drought 
events; rice price support schemes; subsidised support for farmers 
and farming; debt forgiveness 
Securing loans 
from commercial 
banks 
Borrowing money from commercial banks to meet an immediate 
livelihood shortfall or subsistence crisis 
Village 
development 
funds  
One million baht (US$25,000) allocated per village to support small 
business development 
Crisis responses 
Dissolving the 
family 
Families are atomised as individualistic response to crisis supplants 
the traditional communal response 
Moving the family Abandoning the village and lands and moving to urban and peri-
urban areas to access non-farm work opportunities 
 
Table 3: Household complexity in Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song Korn, 1982/83 
and 2008 
 
Household head or relationship to household head 1982/83 2008 
Size of household 6.3 4.7 
   
Simple nuclear family members   
Household head 15.7 21.3 
Spouse of household head 13.6 13.0 
Child of household head 54.2 22.7 
Total nuclear family members 83.5 57.0 
   
Extended household members   
Spouse of child of household head 3.9 8.8 
Grandchild of household head 9.2 21.3 
Spouse of grandchild of household head 0.2 0.0 
Nephew/niece of household head 0.2 2.5 
Parent of household head or spouse 1.0 1.4 
Sibling of household head or spouse 1.6 2.2 
Other extended family members 0.4 6.9 
Total extended household members 16.5 43.1 
   
Total  100 100.1 
 
Source: survey data, 1982/83 and 2008 
Table 4: Government support programmes, 1975 to 2009 
 
Year Programmes Remarks 
1975 Money Distribution 
Programme (ngern 
phan) 
Rural development and job-creation projects during the 
agricultural off-season period 
1984 Rural Development 
Fund 
Targeting villagers and activities within villages 
1992 Urban Community 
Development Fund 
Addressing the urban poverty problem 
1993 Poverty Alleviation 
Project 
Raising income and the quality of life of targeted poor 
households in more than 18,000 rural villages 
1998 Social Investment 
Project  
Creating job opportunities and providing social 
services for the unemployed and poor 
1999-
2000 
Financial support under 
the “Miyazawa” 
scheme  
Tackling the economic and social problems of the 
urban poor during the 1997-98 financial crisis 
2001 Village and Urban 
Community Funds 
Introduced during the first year of the Thaksin 
administration and continuing. Provides financial 
support to villages and urban communities, with the 
aim that villagers become self-reliant, have more 
employment opportunities, higher incomes and 
improved social welfare 
2001 Urban relief fund Introduced during the first year of the Thaksin 
administration. Loans from the Government Savings 
Bank worth 30,000 baht each including to the urban 
poor (e.g. street vendors) 
2001 Three-year debt 
moratorium/debt 
reduction for small 
farmers  
Introduced during the first year of the Thaksin 
administration to cover period 1.4.01 to 31.3.04. 
Assists in reducing debt incurred through Bank of 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and 
poverty of small-scale farmers while offering training. 
2001 People‟s Bank Project  Introduced during the second year of Thaksin 
administration. Operated by the Government Savings 
Bank. A revolving fund of one million baht per village to 
boost domestic demand and support small and 
medium scale enterprises 
2003 Care “Ua-athorn” 
programmes 
Introduced during the third year of Thaksin 
administration. Welfare type policies such as: a life 
insurance scheme for the poor; bicycle loans for 
300,000 students living far from schools; scholarships 
for students from poor households; loans for the 
purchase of low-priced televisions and computers; 
loans for purchase of taxis; and cheap housing for 
middle income urban families. Overall goal to boost 
consumption and income 
2003 Capital creation 
scheme 
Introduced during the third year of Thaksin 
administration. Reclassified or redefined assets to 
achieve a legal title which can be used as collateral to 
obtain loans 
2009 Free education policy Introduced during the first six-months of the Abhisit 
administration. Free education and subsidised 
expenses (e.g. student uniforms, stationery, textbooks 
and compulsory educational activities) for 15 years  
2009 Senior citizens Introduced during the first six-months of the Abhisit 
allowance administration. Covers people >60 years old. 
Allowance of 500 baht monthly 
2009 Cash handout Introduced during the first six-months of the Abhisit 
administration. 2,000 baht cash handout for the lowly 
paid as part of the measures to tackle the 2008-9 
financial crisis through boosting consumer spending 
2009 Sufficiency economy 
fund 
Introduced during the first six-months of the Abhisit 
administration. Fund for local communities 
 
 
Sources: Anuchitworawong 2007; Looney 1981; Phongpaichit 2004; Prime Minister 
Abhisit Vejjajiva 2009. 
 
Table 5: Share of Northeastern village household income by source (1981-2004, %) 
 
 1981 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 
Farm 30.3 27.1 25.1 16.4 18.8 17.9 19.0 
Non-farm 21.3 27.1 30.1 39.4 40.2 40.9 42.2 
Remittance 3.8 3.3 7.9 14.3 12.3 16.4 15.8 
Home 
produced 
32.6 28.6 23.8 14.7 15.5 10.7 8.0 
Other non-
monetary 
income 
12.0 13.9 13.1 15.2 13.2 14.1 15.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Grandstaff et al. 2009: 302 
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Figure 2: A timeline of development (1962-2009) 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Mean income of households by quintile, Ban Non Tae and Ban Tha Song 
Korn (1982/3 and 2008, constant 2008 prices)  
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Source: Survey Data 
Note: n = 77 (1982/83 and 2008) 
 
Figure 4: Main source of income of households in Northeast Thailand (1986-2004, 
percent total households) 
 
 
 
 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2004 
Factory work* 8.0 11.4 18.0 17.9 17.7 18.1 
Business, trade 13.6 11.4 15.6 16.6 18.1 19.6 
General non-agricultural labouring 2.4 2.7 3.8 0.8 1.6 1.2 
Total non-farm 22.4 25.5 37.4 35.3 37.4 38.9 
Agriculture 70.6 64.4 44.5 48.6 39.4 37.2 
Remittances  5.4 10.1 18.1 16.1 23.2 23.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
* = Clerks, construction and factory work 
 
Source: Grandstaff et al. 2009: 298 
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